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Abstract
This thesis examines the relationship between competitive advantage and stock
performance. Using Morningstar’s economic moat rating classifications, this paper contributes to
the competitive advantage literature by providing an empirical assessment of whether wide moat
stocks, or companies deemed to have sustainable competitive advantages, made for superior
investments compared to non-wide moat stocks over a ten-year time-frame from 2008 to 2017.
Additionally, this paper accounts for a previously under-studied topic within the economic moat
literature by specifically analyzing three sectors and nine industries. The results indicate that
wide moat stocks surprisingly may not make for a superior stock investment, as the wide moat
observations in the selected sample were found to have a negative relationship with average
annual returns (coefficient = -0.05) that was statistically significant at the 5% level. Companies
with no economic moat, meanwhile, were found to have a positive relationship with average
annual returns (coefficient = 0.02). Taken together, these results indicate that investment
research firms such as Morningstar may place excessive weight on wide moat status and thus
undervalue seemingly less attractive companies that have the potential to offer far higher returns.
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I. Introduction
What makes for a superior investment? According to famed investor and Berkshire
Hathaway chairman Warren Buffett, one of the keys is to find companies with sustainable
competitive advantages -- or, in his words, wide economic moats. In a 2007 letter to Berkshire
Hathaway shareholders, for instance, Buffett had this to say regarding what he believes
constitutes a successful company:
“A truly great business must have an enduring “moat” that protects excellent returns on
invested capital. The dynamics of capitalism guarantee that competitors will repeatedly assault
any business “castle” that is earning high returns. Therefore a formidable barrier such as a
company being the low-cost producer (GEICO, Costco) or possessing a powerful world-wide
brand (Coca-Cola, Gillette, American Express) is essential for sustained success.”
Buffett’s belief that companies with exploitable edges are successful at withstanding
competition and, in turn, likely to consistently post strong profits is supported by others in
academia, as the competitive advantage literature developed by authors such as Harvard
professor Michael Porter in the early 1980’s includes a number of articles that provide both
theoretical and empirical support in favor of companies with sustainable competitive advantages.
This is certainly not an astonishing claim, though. After all, it is apparent that a company with,
say, unmatched cost advantages (i.e. Walmart) or premier brand prestige (i.e Apple) has little
trouble out-performing their peers.1

This remains true for Walmart and Apple, as each lead their respective industries in a variety of financial metrics
such as revenue and net income.
1

4

Thus, the ideas espoused by the likes of Buffett and Porter have become more prominent
in recent years, particularly with respect to investing. In the early 2000’s, for instance,
Morningstar, a leading investment research firm headquartered in the United States, began to
formally assess economic moats, which it defines as the likelihood a company can maintain a
sustainable competitive advantage and thus keep competitors at bay for an extended period of
time (Morningstar Investing Glossary). More specifically, the firm thoroughly assesses a number
of competitive advantage attributes -- the most notable ones being cost advantages, customer
switching costs, intangible assets (i.e. brand identity; patents; sustainability measures), network
effects, and scale advantages -- in order to determine a company’s ability to succeed in both the
short and long-term.2 And since starting this practice, Morningstar has championed its economic
moat analysis as a hallmark of its investing philosophy and a crucial determinant of its fair value
share price recommendations (Lopez, 2003).
However, there is not a consensus within the economic moat literature supporting the
notion that wide-moat stocks make for superior investments. While a couple of studies, such as
Boyd (2005) and Kanuri and McLeod (2016), found evidence indicating that wide moat stocks
outperform the broader market, Liu and Mantecon (2016) made a compelling case against wide
moat stocks, showing that when compared to stocks assigned either narrow or no moat ratings
according to Morningstar,3 companies deemed to have limited capabilities actually posted higher
average annual stock returns than the distinguished wide moat companies over an eight-year
sample period. And to add support to their argument, the authors referenced noteworthy studies
by the likes of Fama and French (1995) that called into question, for instance, the relative
These moat attributes will explained further in Section II b) of the literature review.
 Narrow and no moat ratings, in essence, signify that a company either possesses only a potential source of a
sustainable competitive advantage (narrow moat) or no source of advantage at all (no moat).
2
3
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success of large growth stocks, many of which are widely believed to possess seemingly
“unbreachable” moats in the words of someone such as Buffett (Morningstar, 2004).
My thesis contributes to this conversation by empirically assessing Morningstar’s
economic moat ratings over a ten-year time-frame in order to answer the following research
question: do wide moat stocks make for a superior investment compared to narrow and no moat
stocks? My study also examines a relatively under-studied topic within the economic moat
literature pertaining to possible stock return differences across sectors. I analyze three sectors
specifically -- technology, healthcare, and consumer defensive -- as well as a number of
industries within each of these sectors to determine if any differences in stock performance
relative to moat status arise.
Surprisingly, my conclusions suggest that wide moat stocks do not necessarily make for a
superior investment. From 2008-2017, I found that a negative relationship existed between the
selected wide moat companies in my study and average annual stock returns, as an upgrade from
non-wide to wide moat status was found to decrease annual stock returns by 5.15%. This
relationship was also statistically significant at the 5% level. Moreover, no moat stocks were
found to be positively related to returns (coefficient = 0.02), suggesting that relative to the
narrow moat benchmark, no moat stocks yielded roughly 2% higher annual returns. Similar
conclusions were also found for a majority of the sectors and industries under observation:
neither the healthcare, consumer defensive, and technology sectors, for instance, reported wide
moat variable coefficients that were both positive and statistically significant. Taken together,
my results contribute to the economic moat literature by providing further empirical evidence as
to the relationship between competitive advantage and stock performance while also adding a
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sector and industry-specific component that had been previously under-studied in the literature.
Moreover, my findings also relate strongly to conclusions reached by Liu and Mantecon (2016),
adding further doubt to prevailing investment strategies that advocate in favor of companies with
sustainable competitive advantages.
This paper will proceed as follows: Section II provides an in-depth review of the origins
of the competitive literature as well as a summary of the noteworthy studies related specifically
to economic moats; Section III discusses methodology and my regression model specifications;
Section IV contains a breakdown of data sources as well as a brief summary of my data
collection process; Section V includes a discussion of all noteworthy results; Section VI provides
an explanation for the reported results, as well as an acknowledgement of my study’s limitations;
Section VII concludes the paper with suggestions for future research and offers final takeaways.

II. Literature Review
One of the fundamental principles in economics is the idea that a firm’s economic profits
will regress to zero in the long-run after accounting for opportunity costs. Nearly every
introductory microeconomic textbook examines this trend, particularly with respect to
monopolistic competition.4 And though this theory relies on a number of caveats, such as
assuming unrestricted access to markets and using a stricter definition of the term profit,5 it is
still a common belief that profits will at least trend toward zero as new firms enter successful

McEachern (2013), for instance, stated the following in his chapter on monopolistic competition: “Low barriers to
entry in monopolistic competition mean that short-run economic profit attracts new entrants in the long-run...Entry
continues in the long-run until economic profit disappears” (pg. 218).
5
In reality, financial profits are used as a measure of performance rather than economic profits, which are difficult
to truly assess.
4
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industries. For instance, Stiger (1963) said, “There is no more important proposition in economic
theory than that, under competition, the rate of return on investment tends toward equality in all
industries. Entrepreneurs will seek to leave relatively unprofitable industries and enter relatively
profitable industries” (p. 54).
Recent studies have examined this trend in greater detail. Fama and French (2000), for
example, assessed whether profitability regresses toward industry averages by compiling a
cross-sectional dataset with financial information dating from 1964-1995. Using pooled
time-series regressions inclusive of an annual average of 2,343 firms in their dataset, the authors
found strong empirical evidence in support of their hypothesis that profitability is
mean-reverting. They also concluded that mean reversion is stronger when a company’s profits
are further from its industry’s mean. In other words, when profits are unusually high (or low, for
that matter), mean-reversion is even more likely to occur.
Not only are these conclusions in accord with standard economic theory concerning the
long-term trend of profits, but they have implications with respect to stock investing. Most
notably, these ideas relate to a fundamental financial economic theory first presented by Eugene
Fama in 1970 called the efficient market hypothesis, which posited that share prices take into
account all publically available information, thus decreasing opportunities to construct superior
portfolios comprised of companies that consistently beat the market.6 Although Fama’s
hypothesis fails to explain the success of investors such as the aforementioned Buffett, arguably
the most noteworthy connection between the efficient market hypothesis and the time-series
trend of profits is that long-term investing success relative to the market is similarly difficult to

To clarify: this is the same Fama that co-authored the aforementioned mean-reversion paper along with Kenneth
French.
6
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sustain, primarily because it is assumed that all investors are equipped with the same information
to accurately evaluate companies.
Important implications also exist as to the role investor responses play with respect to
both the time-series trend of profits and the efficient market hypothesis. To explain why theories
such as Fama’s efficient market hypothesis do not necessarily hold true in reality, many financial
and behavioral economists have explored how investor sentiment affects share prices. Baker and
Wurgler (2007), for instance, discussed how a number of psychological factors, such as
availability bias and overconfidence, have been found to dramatically affect stock prices. They
noted that these implicit biases also vary among investors, resulting in differing reactions as to
the evaluation of a company’s financial fundamentals. Consequentially, investor awareness may
influence sentiment toward a company, and therefore influence its stock returns. And as I will
later discuss with respect to my results, this phenomenon may occur with respect to the stock
performance of companies considered to be well-positioned to successfully compete in the
future.

II a) Michael Porter and the Emergence of Competitive Advantage Literature
Since no firm would willingly allow their company’s profits to decline, companies began
investing their energies into combating this profit regression trend. This, in turn, gave rise to the
competitive advantage literature, which began largely with Michael Porter’s work in the early
1980’s. Starting with his book Competitive Strategy (1980), Porter discussed the ways in which
firms can gain favorable competitive positions in their industry. It is worth mentioning that he
grounds his arguments by commenting first on the aforementioned mean-reversion tendency in

9

profits.7 He then introduced a number of important concepts that help assess whether a firm can
keep competitors at bay, the most notable one being his “Five-Forces” framework (i.e. the five
competitive forces that determine industry attractiveness) which continues to be applicable to
firms looking to implement successful competitive strategies today. In no particular order, these
forces are: the entry of new competitors, the threat of substitutes, the bargaining power of buyers,
the bargaining power of suppliers, and the rivalry among existing competitors.
Porter furthered discussed these concepts in one of his next books, Competitive
Advantage (1985). Advantage continued to detail industry-specific views concerning competitive
positioning while also addressing how a firm might implement and sustain a competitive edge in
its particular industry. For instance, he augmented his Five Forces framework by stressing the
importance of firms establishing either a cost advantage or differentiating qualities. Additionally,
Porter was one of the first in the literature to identify the dynamic nature of competitive
advantage. In other words, favorable positioning in the present does not guarantee favorable
positioning moving forward due primarily to what Porter cited is an “unending battle among
competitors” as well as changes in industry attractiveness. He used Ford Motor Company as an
example to illustrate this trend, as Henry Ford’s innovative manufacturing techniques in the
1910’s helped Ford initially dominate the emerging automobile industry before new firms
entered and adopted similarly advanced production processes in the late ‘20’s, causing Ford’s
substantial edge to decline.
Porter’s contribution to the competitive advantage literature has been largely unmatched,
as numerous other authors, some of whom will be discussed shortly, have cited his framework as
As he said on Page 9: “The threat of entry determines the likelihood that new firms will enter an industry and
compete away the value, either by passing it on to buyers in the form of lower prices or dissipating it by raising the
costs of competing.”
7
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the foundation of their studies. It will also soon be relatively easy to see why Porter’s arguments
are relevant to this thesis. Economic moat analysis not only expands on Porter’s Five Forces to
include qualities such as brand identity, intangible assets, and network effects, but it already
includes factors such as cost advantages and threat of entry.
One minor critique of Porter’s Five Forces model, however, is that his work may be a bit
oversimplified and, in turn, outdated given that both Strategy and Advantage were originally
published over thirty years ago.8 Moreover, Porter focused entirely on how firms can capture
value from consumers. He was not interested in how competitive advantages may affect stock
performance, which makes his work relatively less relevant to this thesis.9 It is also worth
mentioning that Porter’s arguments are entirely theoretical, providing future authors an
opportunity to provide empirical support to his conclusions.
Nonetheless, the competitive advantage literature divulged into two sections following
Porter’s publications: industrial organization (IO) and resource-based theories. The latter has
been analyzed much more frequently in the competitive advantage literature, though, largely
because it concerns factors within the firm’s control and addresses specific factors that lead to
competitive advantage. However, before discussing the resource-based literature, it is worth at
least commenting on the industrial organizational view because it is still essential in forming the
foundations of the competitive advantage literature. And as it relates to this thesis, it is
worthwhile to note why the literature has marginalized this theory.
Unsurprisingly, it was Porter (1981) who summarized the prevailing developments
concerning IO theories and their impact on strategic management. Unlike his two
For instance, he did not offer specific details as to what supplier power entials, nor did he provide nuanced
suggestions for how a firm can identity and strengthen its authority among other business partners.
9
Granted, it could be argued that delivering superior value can ultimately drive successful stock performance.
8
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aforementioned works, Porter incorporated literature published by a number of other authors in
his assessment of IO’s current implications on strategy as well as its possible areas for
improvement. For instance, he analyzed the Learned, Christensen, Andrew, and Guth (LCAG)
framework introduced in 1969, which asserted that successful firms must analyze four key
strategic elements in order to match their strengths with external environmental conditions.10 He
also commented on the Bain/Mason IO paradigm, which essentially argued that firm
performance depends largely on its industry environment.
Porter outlined various reasons why these models have not been widely accepted with
respect to managerial decisions. For instance, Porter noted how these models, particularly the
Bain/Mason paradigm, were too rigid in terms of how firms could determine their own fate. As
he stated: “Traditional IO theory took industry structure as exogenously given, and held that the
firm’s strategy and performance was fully determined by this structure. Thus the firm was stuck
with the structure of its industry and had no latitude to alter the state of affairs.” Porter did
remark, however, that many recent studies attempted to solve these issues -- some with more
success than others. Nonetheless, he concluded by stating that IO theories provided more
significant implications regarding political policy than strategic development.
Powell (1992) is another author who analyzed industry factors and their effect on
competitive advantage. His paper, which examined the organizational alignments in
manufacturing industries, is particularly noteworthy because he ultimately concluded that
industry factors are overrated: external factors, such as industry-wide employment and industry

These elements are: 1) company strengths and weaknesses, 2) industry economic and technical
opportunities/threats, 3) personal values of key implementers, and 4) broader societal expectations.
10
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stability,11 only partly explained what he identified as “supernormal” profits, whereas the
firm-specific components included in his empirical analysis, such as a CEO’s influence on
decision-making, could better explain profitability while holding industry factors constant. Thus,
Powell concluded that resource-based factors seemed to be more useful in explaining how
competitive advantage can drive profits. And though Porter continued to rely heavily on IO
theories in constructing his competitive advantage models outlined in Competitive Advantage,
these two studies help clarify why the literature began to concentrate on resource-based views.
Meanwhile, nearly all of the competitive advantage articles related to resource-based
views (RBV) are grounded in early ideas presented by Wernerfelt (1984). For starters, his paper
was the first to specifically coin the term resource-based view. His work was also significant
because he built on Porter’s Five Forces model in order to assess how firms can best utilize their
resources (which he defined as a firm’s strengths and weaknesses) to achieve higher profitability.
Additionally, Wernerfelt identified a number of other factors that could theoretically
contribute to competitive advantage. Some of the most notable with respect to economic moats
are what he called attractive advantages, which he defined as resources or capabilities that either
directly or indirectly make it difficult for competitors to successfully compete. He specifically
noted factors such as machine capacity, or production processes that lead to higher returns to
scale, which today can be defined more simply as scale advantages. He also identified customer
loyalty and technological leads as other potential factors. This again relates to economic moat
factors such as brand identity, which helps drive customer loyalty, and network effects, which
are often a product of advanced technology. In short, Wernerfelt did a terrific job at further

 his metric was defined by the author using a report from the U.S. Department of Commerce’s ranking of
T
industry stability.
11
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establishing the theoretical components of competitive advantage. It could also be argued that he
offered even more insight than Porter: his ideas are more nuanced, as they not only include more
specific advantage drivers like machine capacity and production experience, but other elements
such as mergers and acquisitions and other avenues for horizontal and/or vertical integration.
In a similar vein, Barney (1991) was another key contributor to the emerging RBV
literature. Barney also incorporated a more firm-specific approach than Porter by discussing the
impact of specific firm attributes on competitiveness, which was previously an understudied
topic in the competitive advantage literature. The primary result from Barney’s conclusions is
that he developed four modified indicators of strategic competitiveness: value, rareness,
imitability, and sustainability. The four indicators are listed in ascending order of importance.
For instance, Barney argued that even if a firm produced a rare product, it could not attain a
competitive advantage unless said product was valuable to consumers. In other words, the firm
would be able to exploit its edge at producing a rare product if only it is of value to consumers
first. Similar to Porter, though, Barney did not offer a quantitative investigation, nor a single
real-world example to support his arguments. Thus, it is difficult to affirm Barney’s theoretical
conclusions, even if what he argued is logical.
Fortunately, Newbert (2008) provided some clarity to this matter. He examined the
prevailing arguments in the resource-based view literature, which he believed relied heavily on
assumptions, at a conceptual level due to the aforementioned empirical gap. Newbert’s
hypotheses build on a notion in the RBV literature that resources and capabilities that are
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valuable and/or rare allow firms to gain a competitive advantage.12 In turn, the attainment of said
advantages will then drive short and long-term financial performance.
Building largely on work from Barney (1991), Newbert looked specifically at the value
and rareness of resources in terms of how they drive competitive advantage and, in turn,
financial performance. He outlined five hypotheses, of which three are particularly relevant to
this study.13 These hypotheses are:

● Hypothesis 1: The value of the resource-capability combinations that a firm
exploits will be positively related to its competitive advantage.
● Hypothesis 2: The rareness of the resource-capability combinations that a firm
exploits will be positively related to its competitive advantage.
● Hypothesis 3: A firm’s competitive advantage will be positively related to its
performance.
In terms of empirical framework, Newbert responded to a research suggestion by Barney
and Mackey (2005) by compiling a sample of 664 micro and nanotechnology companies. He
cited two reasons for choosing this particular group of companies. The first reason connected to
previous literature by Barney and Mackey arguing that competitive advantages have been most
difficult to acquire in “dynamic markets,” which he claimed was important for his study because
he attempted to understand how firms attain competitive advantages rather than maintain them.
Moreover, he argued that since many of these micro and nanotechnology companies are in their

This particular notion is heavily influenced by Barney (1991) and his aforementioned work.
Hypotheses 4 & 5 each concern the mediating role competitive advantage has on the relationship between both
value and the resource-capability and its rareness. This component of the study, in short, is not as relevant as his first
three hypotheses with respect to this thesis.
12
13
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infant stages, it will “offer insights” as to the important mediating role of competitive advantage
outlined in hypotheses 4 & 5. Newbert’s explanations for choosing micro and nanotechnology
companies, however, are confusing, partly because he did not provide a definition of dynamic
markets.14 Combined with his small survey timespan from the fall of 2003 to the spring of 2004,
Newbert’s initial explanation of his data choices falls short.
His study also suffered from flawed methodology choices. In order to compile data
regarding a firm’s value and rareness, Newbert issued surveys to senior-level executives of all
664 companies. This method called for executives to subjectively assess the value and rareness
of their companies’ own resources and capabilities. Though the author attempted to reduce the
potential for bias by adjusting the framing of questions in order to indirectly assess these
competitive advantage indicators, the drawbacks of this approach remain obvious with respect to
response bias.
Regardless, Newbert compiled hundreds of responses and attributed scores reflecting
factors such as the firm’s success at reducing costs.15 He then summarized this data to generate
composite scores for the three categories in his study -- value, rareness, and competitive
advantage -- and compared those results to various financial performance measures.16 Using
hierarchical ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models to test his five hypotheses, Newbert
ultimately found support for the three hypotheses mentioned above. In other words, he concluded
that both value and rareness are positively related to competitive advantage, while competitive

He cited previous literature with respect to this definition, inferring that one must review other articles to gain
further understanding.
15
This is one measure he cited for how a firm derives value.
16
His financial performance data, for the record, was also gathered using these surveys. However, this choice was
not as questionable because a) he incorporated various objective metrics (such as revenue and operating margin) and
b) these subjective measures had been used frequently in previous literature.
14
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advantage is indeed positively correlated with performance. Thus, despite the study’s numerous
shortcomings, Newbert confirmed that RBV hypotheses are now no longer entirely based on
assumptions.

II b) Competitive Advantage and Stock Performance: The Rise of Economic Moats
Arguably the main shortcoming of the aforementioned studies with respect to this thesis
is that they did not analyze the relationship between competitive advantage and stock
performance. In fact, this area of concentration within the competitive literature has only been
examined by a few authors such as Gjerde et al. (2010). Their study contributed to the
conversation by introducing a method for which competitive advantage can be measured as a
single-variable in order to determine whether resource-based or industry-based competitive
advantage is more responsible for abnormal stock performance.
The authors’ attempt to categorize the two types of competitive advantage is particularly
noteworthy. Their method stated that industry-based advantages were earned if return on equity
capital was larger than the average cost of equity capital determined by the capital market.
Resource-based advantages, meanwhile, were classified based on whether a firm had a cost of
equity capital below the industry’s average cost of equity capital. However, though their
definition of industry-based advantage is reasonable considering it is in accord with a
widely-accepted definition used by Barney (2007), their methodology for determining
resource-based advantages is questionable because it has no precedent in the literature. It also
lacked details such as value and rareness that, as mentioned by Barney (1991), have been found
to drive resource-based advantages.
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One strength of this study’s data and methodology, though, is that it included a
significant sample of companies. The authors’ data included 3,051 firm-year observations from
1986-2005 of an assortment of publicly-traded Norwegian companies.17 The large time-frame
and variety of companies help add support to this study’s conclusions.
In order to test these hypotheses, the authors used binary correlation coefficients and
multiple OLS regressions to confirm that the two sources of competitive advantage related
positively to abnormal stock performance. However, these results were only statistically
significant for resource-based competitive advantages, which they found to be significant at the
1% level. Industry-based competitive advantage, on the other hand, was not found to be
statistically significant even at the 10% level. Furthermore, the authors performed numerous
robustness tests, such as splitting the 20-year period into smaller time interval sections, and still
came to the same conclusions, which lends further credence to their support of resource-based
competitive advantages as a contributing factor to superior stock performance.
Other studies, meanwhile, have analyzed the relationship between specific competitive
advantage attributes, such as the four outlined by Barney (1991), and stock performance.18
Arguably the most notable one to be studied recently is sustainability. Kruger (2015), for
instance, analyzed how the markets responded to events related to corporate social responsibility
(CSR). Using a uniquely constructed dataset of 2,116 CSR events from 2001 to 2007, he found
that investors reacted negatively following both negative and positive events, although the
reaction was far stronger for negative events. Nonetheless, the latter conclusion concerning
negative reactions to seemingly positive developments is still surprising, but Kruger reasoned

17
18

All companies were listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange.
Recall that the four attributes outlined by Barney were value, rareness, imitability, and sustainability.
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that stock investors likely think negatively of CSR initiatives regardless if they are deemed to be
a positive event.19
One of the strengths of Kruger’s paper is his effort to account for endogeneity issues. As
he explained with respect to previous studies investigating CSR’s effect on stock performance,
the observance of a positive relationship between the variables can be interpreted in two different
ways: socially responsible firms may earn higher profits or perhaps firms that earn higher profits
are more likely, in turn, to be socially responsible. Kruger accounts for this potential reverse
causality issue, though, by using an event study to measure short-term changes in shareholder
value.
However, given the challenges in identifying observable events related to other
competitive advantage attributes,20 potential endogeneity issues still exist with respect to the
relationship between competitive advantage and stock performance and are thus a possible
reason why this relationship has been relatively understudied.21 Another reason is that
competitive advantages are difficult to examine empirically. After all, there is hardly an
objective technique for measuring competitive advantage -- and those that have used a
quantitative procedure to measure it, such as Gjerde et al (2010), made questionable decisions
concerning their definitions because some of their methods had not been supported by past
literature.

This makes sense theoretically because CSR initiatives tend to be rather costly.
In other words, the difficulty in determining what constitutes a competitive advantage “event study” has likely
deterred scholars away from this subject. Perhaps a news headline such as “Apple’s brand identity recently named
number one among S&P 500 companies” could constitute as an intangible asset event, but the precise specifics of
these sort of measurements obviously would need further clarification. This gap in the competitive advantage
literature, however, will be discussed further in this paper’s conclusion.
21
Scholars, in short, have yet to confirm whether competitive advantages may drive superior stock performance, or
whether superior stock performance actually may lead to competitive advantages.
19
20
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More recently, however, a new term for competitive advantage -- economic moat -- has
emerged in the financial world and assisted in this dilemma. The term was first coined by famed
investor and Berkshire Hathaway chairman Warren Buffett, who in his annual letters to
shareholders would continuously reference firms with “economic castles protected by
unbreachable moats” as one of the primary factors he looks for in a profitable investment
(Morningstar 2004). Due largely to Buffett’s investing success,22 many investment and
investment research firms have recently popularized this strategy predicated around finding
companies with economic moats.
The most notable example is undoubtedly Morningstar, an independent investment
research firm whose platforms are widely used by other companies in the financial services
industry.23 Morningstar goes to great lengths to assess the strength of a firm’s economic moat.
The firm provides in-depth analyst reports, for instance, on over 1,000 publicly-traded
companies; and in each of these reports, a section is devoted to assigning and explaining the
particular company’s economic moat rating. More specifically, Morningstar’s committee of
senior researchers uses a combination of quantitative and qualitative factors to assess the specific
attributes that determine a company’s economic moat rating. The five main attributes it analyzes,
as stated in its investing glossary, are as follows:

Berkshire Hathaway’s market capitalization is close to $500 billion. Buffett also reportedly has a net worth of
over $80 billion.
23
Morgan Stanley, for instance, relies heavily on Morningstar’s analysis when preparing stock and ETF reports for
clients.
22
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Moat Attribute

Explanation

Example

Cost advantage

Any structural advantage that
enables firms to reduce costs and/or
charge lower prices

McDonald’s sells cheeseburgers
for as little as $1, far below the cost
of a burger at many other
restaurants

Efficient scale

When a market is effectively served
by only one or a small number of
companies; usually occurs when
market has high barriers to entry.

Morningstar cites energy companies
such as Enterprise Products
Partners that have natural
geographic monopolies that are
essentially unbreachable by
competitors as noteworthy
examples.

Intangible assets

Includes patents, brand identity,
corporate sustainability initiatives,
company culture, and any other
intangible factor that contributes to
a firm’s ability to charge a premium
price or prevent competitors from
duplicating the success of a
company’s product or service.

Apple’s strong brand identity -- it
was ranked as the world’s #1 global
brand by Interbrand in 2017 -drives profits for the iPhone, which
contributes to superior performance
over the likes of Samsung.

Network effects

Occurs when value of a platform or
service increases as more
consumers and/or sellers join.

eBay becomes more valuable as
more buyers search for products on
the site, which incentivizes more
sellers of products to list their
items.

Switching costs

How easy is it for a customer to
switch to a competitor’s product?

An airline that secures a contract
with an airplane producer like
Boeing, for instance, is likely
locked in to paying billions for
planes over a number of years.

It should be noted that these five attributes are not necessarily the only ways in which a
firm can achieve an economic moat. Other variables, such as government assistance for a large
aerospace & defense company like Boeing, could be another source of competitive advantage.

21

Moreover, as mentioned above, Morningstar’s economic moat assessments are both qualitative
and quantitative in nature. With respect to the latter, the firm’s researchers analyze metrics such
as the spread between a company’s return on invested capital (ROIC) and its cost of capital. It
also compares other key ratios, such as return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA),
across companies to assess whether a company has held a dominant position in its industry
(Morningstar Indexes Yearbook).24 However, these evaluations do not employ advanced
econometric techniques,25 as Morningstar’s analyst reports not only tend to use rather
unadvanced quantitative metrics, but these metrics oftentimes are referenced in order to support
the analyst’s largely qualitative argument.26
Nonetheless, Morningstar’s adoption of this strategy has allowed for a number of
possible breakthroughs regarding the further study of competitive advantage with respect to
stock performance. For starters, the attributes used to assess economic moat ratings are grounded
in often-cited and heavily supported work by the likes of Porter (1980, 1985) and Barney (1991).
Moreover, economic moat ratings help solve issues that plagued the likes of Newbert (2008) and
Gjorde et al. (2010) concerning how those authors defined competitive advantage. Whereas those
authors relied on faulty assumptions when determining their single-variable metrics, Morningstar
relies on objective analyst assessments that incorporate a number of quantitative and qualitative
factors.27

With respect to ROE, for example, Morningstar prefers companies to have a figure above 20% in order to be
deemed a wide moat company.
25
 For example, I have seen analyst reports in which the analyst will cite a company’s ranking on Interbrand's brand
identity power rankings in order to argue that it has a recognizable brand.
26
See Appendix, Table 12 for a diagram that further illustrates Morningstar’s moat rating process.
27
It is likely that these analyst reports are trustworthy due to the fact that Morningstar is one of the most popular
investment research firms and is currently relied upon by major financial service firms like Morgan Stanley.
24
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Moreover, Morningstar’s moat ratings also allow for easier classification between firms
deemed to have sustainable and unsustainable competitive advantages. Those with sustainable
competitive advantages are classified as “wide moat” firms. Those with either flimsy advantages
or competitive advantages that are not necessarily sustainable moving forward are classified as
“narrow moat” firms. Those with no competitive advantages to speak of at all are classified as
“no moat” firms. These classifications are vital to this thesis, as they allow for a simpler, and
perhaps even more accurate framework, to identify competitive advantage and track subsequent
stock performance.
Additionally, there is an important time component to the evaluation of economic moats
worth mentioning as well. The dynamic nature of competition as described by Porter (1980)
means a company’s moat status could be wide one year and narrow the next. Thus, Morningstar
updates its analyst reports on a three to six month basis and, if necessary, revises its economic
moat classifications.

II c) Studies Evaluating the Success of Wide Moat Firms
Given the abundance of theoretical, rather than empirical, studies evaluating competitive
advantage discussed previously, the question then becomes whether the same is true for the
economic moat literature: have authors studied whether wide moat firms actually achieve
superior stock market performance? In short, the literature is also relatively thin with respect to
studies that empirically assess the success of wide moat firms.
Granted, there are a few obvious reasons why this is the case. For starters, Morningstar
did not fully embrace economic moats as part of its investing philosophy until the early 2000’s.
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The firm also did not begin to formally include economic moat analysis as part of each analyst
report until roughly 2002. Morningstar’s archives, in turn, do not provide a very long time-frame
in order to empirically assess the long-term merits of this strategy. Moreover, perhaps
pre-conceived notions play a role as well. Other authors in the competitive advantage literature,
for instance, seemed to take for granted that ideas such as Porter’s Five Forces and Barney’s
drivers of competitive advantage would naturally lead to superior financial and/or stock
performance if a firm possessed such advantages. However, this assertion fails to thoroughly
account for issues such as endogeneity.
Nonetheless, with respect to the economic moat literature, surprisingly there is not a
consensus concerning whether wide moat firms make for superior investments. But before
assessing the study that throws Morningstar’s investing philosophy into question, I will first
discuss Boyd (2005) because he was one of the first authors to formally use Morningstar’s
economic moat ratings in a study testing Buffett and Morningstar’s “intuitively appealing”
premise that wide moat stocks make for superior investments. In addition to examining the stock
performance of large and mid-cap companies with wide moats from 2000 to 2004, the author
was interested in confirming both Buffett and Morningstar’s claim that companies with
sustainable competitive advantages follow an upward earnings trajectory.28 Boyd claimed to find
support for both of his hypotheses. Wide moat firms did achieve superior stock performance
based on Value Line’s measure of price growth persistence and Boyd argued that there was also
evidence that these stocks had positive earnings stability.29

These wide moat large-cap stocks, for the record, are known as Morningstar’s Bellwether 50.
Value Line’s model, in short, assesses share price growth compared to the growth of an average stock. According
to Boyd, these persistence ratings “range from 100 (highest) to 5 (lowest)” (51).
28
29
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However, a notable shortcoming of this study is its surprising lack of empirical support.
In other words, Boyd essentially argued that since these stocks appeared to sustain their earnings
per share figures, as well as the fact that 39 of the 50 wide moat large-cap stocks in
Morningstar’s Bellwether 50 noticeably outperformed the market, wide moat stocks therefore
deliver superior returns. While not necessarily wrong, this evidence alone is not entirely
convincing because it does not feature a regression model, nor does it account for possible
control variables such as the overall performance of the market.
Kanuri and McLeod (2016), however, provided a stronger case for wide moat stocks.
Their study analyzed whether wide moat companies deliver superior returns relative to two
standard benchmark indices: the S&P 500 and Russell 3000. The authors used Morningstar’s
moat classification system to assemble an initial portfolio of wide moat stocks starting in 2002,
which they continuously updated until 2014 as Morningstar reevaluated its moat ratings. Kanuri
and McLeod then gathered a variety of risk-adjusted performance (RAP) measures, such as
Sharpe and Sortino ratios, to thoroughly assess the performance of the portfolios on a monthly
and yearly basis. The authors ultimately concluded that the wide moat stocks had higher returns
relative to the two indices even while adjusting for risk. These returns were also statistically
significant at the 1% level.
This study had a few noteworthy elements that not only added merit to the authors’
conclusions, but have particular relevance with regard to this thesis. First, in contrast to Boyd,
who examined only a five-year dataset, Kanuri and McLeod constructed annual portfolios of
wide moat companies over a 12-year period. This longer time-frame (June 2002 to May 2014) is
less prone to selection bias, as it encompassed both the years before and after the Great
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Recession of 2007-08. The twelve-year period also allowed for a better assessment of
Morningstar’s buy-and-hold strategy for these wide moat companies.
Additionally, the study offered a variety of other conclusions that are far more nuanced
than a study such as Boyd’s. For instance, the authors found that the wide moat portfolio had a
higher aggregate Sharpe ratio,30 which suggested that the wide moat portfolio compensated
investors better relative to the risk method. They also reported a higher Sortino ratio, which
indicated that the wide moat portfolio was less likely to incur heavy losses.31 Moreover, their
results were strengthened by other robustness checks which factored in models such as Carhart’s
Four Factor Model (1997), which adjusts for “momentum,” or previous acceleration in share
growth over the previous twelve months. The authors also included a separate model which only
examined data during the Great Recession from 2007-2009. In both cases, support for their
conclusions was strengthened.32
One notable shortcoming of Kanuri and McLeod’s study, though, was that they did not
compare the stock performance of wide moat firms in relation to narrow and/or no moat firms. In
theory, such an analysis could provide even more support for wide moat stock investing because
it could prove if wide moat stocks not only outperform the market, but if they outperform
portfolios comprised largely of narrow and no moat stocks as well.
However, as mentioned earlier, there is not a consensus in the economic moat literature: a
recent study by Liu and Mantecon (2016) that compared the stock performance of wide moat

More formally, the authors explained that Sharpe ratio “evaluates how well an investment compensates its
investor for each unit of risk incurred.”
31
As stated by the authors, “a large Sortino Ratio indicates low risk of large losses occurring.”
32
In the case of the Great Recession dataset, for instance, the authors found that while the wide moat stocks posted
only a -2.62% average monthly return, this portfolio still outperformed the S&P 500 (-3.15%) and Russell 3000
(also -3.15%).
30
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firms versus narrow and no moat firms surprisingly found that firms with no economic moat
outperformed those with wide moats. In other words, firms with absolutely no evidence of a
sustainable competitive advantage somehow outperformed companies that an investor like
Buffett would praise for having “unbreachable moats” (Morningstar, 2004).
On the surface, this conclusion does not make much sense; but from an empirical
perspective, the authors’ case was fairly convincing. After assembling annual portfolios of stocks
based on whether Morningstar assigned a wide, narrow, or no moat rating, the authors found that
no moat portfolios outperformed the wide moat portfolios by an average of 7% annually.33
However, when they included a larger variety of controlling variables into their Fama and
MacBeth (1973) regression model34, this conclusion was not found to be statistically significant
even at the 10% level.
Thus, the authors then decided to expand the time-frame of their study in order to
decrease the likelihood of sampling bias. One problem, though, was that Morningstar’s moat
ratings only dated back to the 2000’s, so Liu and Mantecon made the ambitious choice to study
the determinants of moat rating and constructed a quasi-predictive framework for moat status
that could theoretically allow them to assess competitive advantage dating back to 1964.35 Again,
this was an ambitious choice, but the larger time span strengthened the authors’ conclusions, as
no moat firms again outperformed wide moat firms.36

Narrow moat firms, for the record, also outperformed wide moat firms, but this result was only based on the
authors’ summary statistic table. For some reason, the authors did not include narrow moat firms into their
regressions -- they exclusively studied the performance of wide moat versus no moat firms.
34
Variables included size, book-to-market ratios, beta, earnings yield, and financial leverage.
35
In other words, the authors assessed the likelihood that firms with, say, a larger market capitalization received a
wide moat rating and extrapolated those probabilities across a variety of companies in order to construct a large
dataset from 1964-2011.
36
These results were also statistically significant based on the authors’ Fama-MacBeth regressions, although they
were significant at only the 10% level.
33
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Empirical results aside, the intuitive case explaining why no moat firms outperformed
wide moat firms in terms of stock performance is also compelling. The authors mentioned, for
instance, that even if a firm has a competitive advantage, this advantage may already be factored
into the share price. This idea relates strongly to the aforementioned efficient market hypothesis,
which posited that share prices take into account all publically available information, thus
decreasing opportunities to find companies that consistently beat the market.
Moreover, the authors also asserted that wide moat stocks were far more stable than no
moat stocks, as the median annual return for wide moat firms was significantly higher than no
moat firms (8.0% vs -2.7%). To explain why no moat firms performed better overall, the authors
presented evidence relating to how the no moat stock portfolios were driven by a few extreme
examples: only eight firms, for instance, experienced exceptional stock growth higher than 1,000
percent over the sample period. Unsurprisingly, all eight of these firms were no moat stocks.
Furthermore, the authors found that the wide moat portfolios were mostly comprised of
large growth stocks.37 Liu and Mantecon cited empirical evidence in their literature review
arguing that large stocks tend to have lower annual stock returns, while other studies, such as
Lakonishok et al. (1994) and Fama and French (1995), attest to the profitability of value stocks
over growth stocks.38 Lakonishok et al, for instance, found evidence of mean-reversion and lower
returns for growth stocks compared to value stocks. In other words, even though the growth
firms in their sample had superior financial numbers than the value firms, higher expectations for
future growth rates combined with profits gradually regressing to the industry mean suggested

94% of the wide moat stocks in their portfolios, for instance, had large market capitalizations. Another 74% were
growth stocks, which was markedly higher than the percentage of growth stocks in the no moat portfolios (34%).
38
Value stocks, in short, refer to companies whose shares are trading below market level. These companies, as Liu
and Mantecon state, tend to have weaker fundamentals, such as high book-to-market ratios. Growth stocks, in
contrast, refer essentially to expensive stocks, or stocks that are value more highly by the market.
37
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that value stocks actually made for the better investment. Fama and French, meanwhile, came to
a similar conclusion, suggesting that over the course of a 22-year sample, value stocks had
higher monthly growth rates than growth stocks despite the latter group including far more
popular companies as evidenced by ratios such as price/earnings (P/E).

II d) Summary
To relate this discussion back to the introduction of my literature review, Liu and
Mantecon (2016) arrived at these surprising conclusions despite also proving in another
component of their study that wide moat stocks were far less likely to experience mean-reverting
tendencies, such as declining profit margins and return on equity. So how can one further explain
the underperformance of wide moat stocks despite these companies exhibiting characteristics of
sustainable performance, as predicted by the likes of Buffett and Morningstar?
In short, the results of this paper pose a number of questions related to the competitive
advantage literature, specifically with respect to whether firms that possess sustainable
advantages outperform those without such competitive abilities in the stock market. As
mentioned previously, the competitive literature originally developed by the likes of Porter
(1980, 1985) and Barney (1991) seemed to reach a consensus regarding whether a firm that
successfully produced products or services that were viewed as valuable, rare, or inexpensive
achieved superior financial performance. Empirical studies, such as Newbert (2008), reached this
conclusion as well.
There is not a clear consensus with respect to stock performance, though, based on Liu
and Mantecon’s paper. Their results throw investing philosophies from the likes of Morningstar

29

into question, although it is important to remember the conclusions reached by Gjerde et al.
(2010), Boyd (2005), and Kanuri and McLeod (2016) supported investing strategies predicated
around wide moat stocks. Still, Liu and Mantecon’s argument that wide moat stocks may be
overrated is not without merit based on widely-accepted literature presented by Fama (1970),
Lakonishok et al. (1994), and Fama and French (1995).
Therefore, this thesis will add clarity to the conversation by assessing the relationship
between economic moats and stock performance. More specifically, this study will provide
empirical evidence based on an assessment of Morningstar’s economic moat ratings over a
ten-year stretch (2008 to 2017) in order to answer the following research question: do wide moat
stocks make for a superior investment compared to narrow and no moat stocks? Additionally,
while most of the competitive advantage literature has paid particular attention to resource-based
advantages as a driver of firm performance, my thesis will focus on sector and industry-related
factors, which have been largely neglected by the literature yet may be more relevant in terms of
explaining stock performance than previously thought.
While the precise empirical relationship between wide moat companies and stock
performance may be ambiguous based on Liu and Mantecon’s conclusions, my hypothesis is that
wide moat stocks will generate higher returns than non-wide stocks in all facets of my empirical
analysis. This expectation is based on the abundance of theoretical papers published by the likes
of Porter (1980, 1985) and Barney (1991), as well as the moat-specific studies by authors such as
Kanuri and McLeod (2016) and Boyd (2005), that have confirmed the importance of competitive
advantage.
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But as Liu and Mantecon (2016) proved in their paper, perhaps such information is
already priced into the stock market -- and perhaps the investment strategies hailed by firms such
as Morningstar place excessive weight on wide economic moats. The empirical ambiguity with
respect to this hypothesis, therefore, means that it is possible I will find unexpected signs with
respect to my primary hypothesis. The following sections describing the methodology and results
from my study will determine if that is the case.

III. Methodology
Building largely on methodology used by Liu and Mantecon (2016), my empirical model
will feature competitive advantage (i.e. economic moat status) as the study’s primary
independent variable in order to analyze whether competitive advantage contributes to superior
stock market performance. More specifically, economic moat status will be factored into a
regression model that includes a number of company-specific dependent variables, such as
annual stock returns and annual stock returns relative to overall market performance, designed to
assess whether wide moat stocks make for particularly profitable investments compared to
companies designated as having narrow or no economic moats. Thus, my study differs from
Boyd (2005) and Kanuri and McLeod (2016), whose papers focused specifically on wide moat
firms and whether they outperform the market, and is most similar to Liu and Mantecon (2016).
The latter study included companies categorized under each of Morningstar’s moat
classifications in an effort to assess whether wide moat stocks outperformed narrow and no moat
stocks. My thesis will do the same.

31

Another component of their study that I will emulate is how the authors first discussed
general comparisons regarding the sample’s annual portfolio performance of wide, narrow, and
no moat stocks. Since their results showed that wide moat stocks had both lower raw and
market-adjusted returns, the regression models became even more consequential in terms of
further detailing the relationship between economic moats and stock performance. Moreover, the
authors included a wide range of control variables, such as market capitalization, book-to-market
ratio, and price-to-earnings ratio, that have been used previously in the financial economic
literature by the likes of Fama and MacBeth (1973) and Fama and French (1993). My study will
follow the same strategy as Liu and Mantecon by including the following company-specific
control variables in order to further explain differences in stock performance: market
capitalization, price-to-book, and price-to-earnings. I will explain why I selected these particular
variables shortly.
The main difference between my study and Liu and Mantecon (2016), however, is with
respect to how I will segment the stock portfolios. Whereas their study only classified the
companies in their annual portfolios based on moat status, I will also classify my portfolios by
sector because sector-related factors are an understudied topic within the economic moat
literature as it relates to stock performance. In other words, I will determine whether competitive
advantage is a greater influence on stock performance in certain sectors rather than others by
running separate regressions for stocks in the technology, consumer defensive, and healthcare
sectors. Moreover, I will also examine whether any significant results arise from running
separate regressions based on specific industries within each of the aforementioned sectors. Nine
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industries qualified for inclusion in this component of the study based on imposed sample size
requirements.39 A list of these nine industries can be found in Table 1 of the Appendix.
The three sectors that are included in this dataset, however, were chosen for a few
reasons. For starters, after segmenting companies by sector through Morningstar’s premium
stock screener, the three selected sectors had the largest sample of companies that fit all of my
requisite data requirements (more on data qualifications in Section IV). In addition, each of these
sectors possibly feature industry-specific effects that may make moat status more valuable in
certain industries. Many companies in the technology sector, for instance, are known to have
wild fluctuations in share prices, as evidenced by the Dot Com bubble in the early 2000’s.
Perhaps this pressure to consistently produce innovative products makes the industry more
volatile, and moat status, in turn, less secure. The healthcare industry, in contrast, appears to be
more stable: citizens are in constant need of healthcare; there are usually high start-up and
research & development costs to enter the industry; and government programs often provide
these companies assistance, which possibly ensures that many of these firms have the
opportunity to post consistent profits. Sustaining a competitive advantage in the healthcare
sector, in short, appears to more feasible. Furthermore, it could be argued that the consumer
defensive sector serves as a benchmark for economic moat’s effect on performance compared to
the other two sectors, as many consumer defensive companies, such as Johnson & Johnson,
produce products that are often difficult to differentiate in terms of value. Thus, perhaps moat
status is less likely to be an influence on returns in this sector, whereas it could potentially have a
greater effect on companies competing in the technology and healthcare sectors.
I required a minimum of 70 annual observations for inclusion. Thus, many industries were dropped due to not
having a preferable number of observations. Others were also excluded due to collinearity issues in their respective
regressions.
39
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III a) Model Specifications
I estimate my main regressions using fixed effects. My formulas are as follows:
1) Returnit = β o + β 1 W ideit + β 2 N oit + β 3 N arrowit + β 4 M arketCapit + β 5 P B it + β 6 P E it + τ t + θi + εit
2) AdjReturnit = β o + β 1 W ideit + β 2 N oit + β 3 N arrowit + β 4 M arketCapit + β 5 P B it + β 6 P E it + τ t + θi + εit
The first dependent variable -- Returnit -- represents average annual stock return for stock
i in year t , while AdjReturnit accounts for returns relative to the annual performance of the
broader market for stock i in year t . The three moat status dummy variables are the primary
independent variables under observation. W ideit segments wide moat stocks from non-wide
moat stocks (Wide = 1; Non-Wide = 0). N oit segments no moat stocks from wide and narrow
moat stocks (None = 1; Wide and Narrow = 0). N arrowit segments narrow moat stocks from
wide and no moat stocks (Narrow = 1; Wide and None = 0). The first two dummy variables will
be particularly insightful with respect to my study’s results because they better isolate the
performance of stocks based on moat status.40 Thus, N arrowit will serve as a benchmark for
comparison between W ideit and N oit . Moreover, this decision to use dummy variables for moat
status in order to eliminate any categorical effects that may have hindered the assessment of
whether moat status is related to stock performance also follows the same regression framework
utilized by Liu and Mantecon (2016).
My hypothesis for W ideit is that it will be positively related to both Returnit and
AdjReturnit . In contrast, my hypothesis for N oit is that it will be negatively related to the

In other words, I will be able to more accurately determine whether wide moat stock returns were superior over
the selected sample period based on the wide moat dummy variable coefficients as opposed to the narrow moat
variable because the latter lumps together wide and no moat stocks, which are each inherently disparate.
40

34

dependent variables. As mentioned previously, however, the relationship between these variables
is empirically ambiguous based on the conflict in the economic moat literature. Therefore, it is
possible that the regression results will yield unexpected signs.
Moreover, I control for yearly variation over the ten-year sample by treating τ t as a time
fixed effects variable, while θi represents my model’s company fixed effects variable. In
addition, my model has three other control variables: M arketCapit , P B it , and P E it .
M arketCapii represents each company’s annual market capitalization. P B ii stands for
Price/Book ratio, while P E it is Price/Earnings. These two variables were also observed at the
yearly level for each company observation; and taken together, these three control variables were
included largely because they were incorporated into the regression model used by Liu and
Mantecon (2016).41 Furthermore, though this thesis is focused on moat status’ relationship to
stock returns, I expect positive signs for each of the three control variables based largely on
conclusions reached by Lakonishok et al. (1994) and Fama and French (1995). However, my
hypothesis for the magnitude of each of these coefficients is ambiguous because these particular
relationships have not been previously analyzed in the literature.
In addition, these independent variables are also included in my additional regressions
which assess the relationship between moat status and returns for each of the three sectors
included in my dataset, as well as specific industries within those sectors. The three sectors, as
mentioned, are consumer defensive, healthcare, and technology. The nine industries are as

Due to data collection constraints, I could not factor in all five control variables used by those authors, though.#
This is not a huge concern, however, because I still include three of the components used by Liu and Mantecon
(2016), although there is a slight difference with respect to my inclusion of Price/Book ratio, as the aforementioned
authors used a slightly different equation: Book-to-Market ratio. Since I did not have access to Book-to-Market
ratios over the ten-year period, I used Price/Book ratio as an alternative measure.
41
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follows: alcoholic beverages, biotechnology, drug manufacturers, health care plans, household &
personal products, information technology, medical instruments, semiconductors, and software.
Similar to my primary regression measuring whether W ideit is positively related to
Returnit across all observations included in the dataset, I also expect that for each sector and
industry there will be a positive relationship between wide moat stocks and annual returns and a
negative relationship between no moat stocks and annual returns. However, I anticipate that the
degree to which competitive advantage relates positively to stock performance will differ with
respect to certain sectors and industries. As mentioned earlier, I theorize that wide moat status
will be easier to maintain for companies in the healthcare sector as opposed to the technology
sector, for instance. It is reasonable to infer, therefore, that if a company is more likely to
maintain its wide moat rating, it would also be more likely to consistently generate superior stock
returns. Thus, I expect the coefficients to be highest for the healthcare regression and lowest for
the technology regression.42
Additionally, I expect these effects to relate strongly to the industry-specific regressions.
In other words, since I expect to see a higher coefficient for the healthcare regression, I also
anticipate seeing similar signs for the four healthcare industries under observation.43 It is worth
mentioning, however, that since this sector and industry-specific component of my thesis has
been under-studied in the economic moat literature, these particular hypotheses are based largely
on my intuition rather than previous theories presented by other authors. Moreover, with respect
to no moat stocks, I also expect a negative relationship between N oit and Returnit for each

42

I expect the consumer defensive sector, in short, to split the difference.
As shown in Table 13 in the Appendix , these four industries are: Biotechnology, Drug Manufacturers, Health
Care Plans, and Medical Instruments.
43
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sector and industry akin to my hypothesis for the no moat dummy variable in my primary
regressions. Due to the lack of attention on sector and industry differences in the economic moat
literature, though, the magnitude of these negative relationships by sector and industry is
ambiguous.
Lastly, my thesis also includes two additional empirical specifications that will add
further insight to my research question. First, I created lag variables for each of the three moat
dummies as well as my two dependent variables in order to account for the influence moat status
in a given year can have on the following year’s moat status classification. These five lag
variables are: lagW ideit , lagN oneit , lagN arrowit , lagReturnit , and lagAdjReturnit . In
addition, I will briefly comment in my results section on the interaction between my two primary
moat dummy variables ( W ideit and N oit ) and my three control variables ( M arketCapit , P B it ,
and P E it ). These six additional variables are as follows: W ideM C it , W ideP B it , W ideP E it ,
N oM C it , N oP B it , and N oP E it . None of the aforementioned economic moat-related studies
commented on how moat status may impact these particular control variables. Thus, my
expectations for these interaction results are ambiguous.

IV. Data
Nearly all information included in my dataset is from Morningstar. The investment
research firm provided all information related to the following variables: economic moat status,
sector classifications, average annual share prices, annual stock returns, market capitalization,
price-to-book, price-to-cash flow, and price-to-earnings. Economic moat status is often updated
on an annual basis by Morningstar, so to assemble moat ratings, I assembled data from the first
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analyst report of each year. Other variables collected from Morningstar were taken from each
company’s respective ten-year summary chart of all relevant financial data. Average annual
percentage returns for the market, meanwhile, was taken from the Kenneth French data library.
Only one variable -- adjusted return-- was calculated manually by subtracting each company’s
annual return by the market’s overall annual return in order to gage whether a company
outperformed the market in a given year.
My collection of firm data spans from January 2008 to December 2017. This time-frame
was chosen primarily because Morningstar only provides information for many of the
aforementioned variables dating back to 2008.44 And with respect to economic moat status in
particular, Morningstar did not begin to consistently include formal moat classifications until the
mid-2000’s. However, this ten-year sample period is sufficient enough to test the assumption that
firms with sustainable competitive advantages make for better long-term investments,
particularly since this dataset comprises multiple business cycles (i.e. the Great Recession and
the expansion period following the crisis).
In all, 170 companies across the technology, consumer defensive, and healthcare sectors
are included in the dataset, with each one featuring ten annual observations regarding its moat
status and stock performance data for that particular year. However, an important note with
respect to the size of the dataset is that I was forced to make a number of decisions regarding
which companies were included in the final sample. Most notably, a company could not be
included if Morningstar did not provide an analyst report because economic moat classifications
can only be accessed through Morningstar’s archives through these analyst reports. For

44

Ratios such as P/B and P/E are also only shown over the past ten years on Morningstar, for example.
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reference, Morningstar currently provides analyst reports on 1,056 publicly-traded companies, so
my dataset was immediately trimmed based on this limitation.45 Moreover, I also excluded
companies that had not been public for at least ten years because investment philosophies that
emphasize the importance of competitive advantages stress that wide moat companies are a
superior long-term investment rather than a short one. Thus, even wide moat companies that
have been public for, say, three years, would not necessarily make for a profitable short-term
investment according to this theory.
Summary tables breaking down the distribution of the 1,700 total observations by
industry and by moat rating can be found below.

Table 1: Sector Breakdown
Sector

# of Comp.

# of Obs.

Percentage

Consumer Defensive

40

400

23.53%

Healthcare

63

630

37.06%

Technology

67

670

39.41%

Total

170

1,700

100%

45

This will be discussed further in the paper’s section on limitations.
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Table 2: Moat Breakdown by Sector
Sector

# of Wide Moat
Obs.

# of Narrow
Moat Obs.

# of No Moat Obs.

Total

Consumer
Defensive

163

169

68

400

Healthcare

228

342

60

630

Technology

167

360

143

670

Total

558 (32.82%)

871 (51.2%)

271 (15.9%)

1,700

Table 1 shows the distribution of companies by sector. Table 2, meanwhile, provides
additional insight into the moat breakdown by sector. One obvious takeaway is the relative lack
of no moat firms in the healthcare sector (10%, as a percentage of total healthcare observations),
as well as the relative abundance of healthcare firms with either wide or narrow moats (35% and
55%, respectively). The selection of consumer defensive stocks, however, contain the largest
percentage of wide moat observations relative to the other sectors (40.8% as a percentage of total
consumer defensive observations), followed by healthcare (36.2%) and technology (24.9%).
Table 3 offers a summary table of the moat dummy and return data, as well as averages
for the various control variables. The average yearly unadjusted return among the selected stocks
was 16.1%, while the average adjusted return was 5.5%. With respect to the former, these yearly
returns ranged from roughly -88% to 311%.
Lastly, Table 4 indicates the variation in moat status categories by year.46 The narrow
moat category comprised the largest segment of the 1,700 observations, although this category
also experienced a significant amount of variation over the ten-year sample (-22.92% decline in

Note: time trend tables for each moat dummy category essentially yielded the same results. For instance, a table
for WideDummy indicated the same distribution of wide moat observations in the “1” column, while the “0” column
was simply the sum of all remaining narrow and no moat observations.
46
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narrow moat observations from 2008-2017). The wide moat category, however, experienced the
largest amount of variation, as the 64 observations in 2017 marked a 36.17% increase compared
to 2008. The no moat category, meanwhile, was the most stable.
Table 3: Summary Statistics
Variable

Observations

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

MoatDummy

1,700

.328

.469

0

1

Annual Return (%)

1,700

.161

.375

-.879

3.11

Adjusted Return
(%)

1,700

.055

.321

-.989

2.82

Market Cap. ($
millions)

1,700

40,928

68,807

200

906,472

Price/Book

1,700

6.45

28.00

0

850.79

Price/Earnings

1,700

28.58

84.17

0

2464.5

Table 4: Moat Rating by Year
Year

Wide

Narrow

None

Total

2008

47

96

27

1,700

2009

48

96

26

1,700

2010

46

96

28

1,700

2011

51

91

28

1,700

2012

53

86

31

1,700

2013

58

87

25

1,700

2014

62

83

25

1,700

2015

64

82

24

1,700

2016

65

80

25

1,700

2017

64

74

32

1,700

Total

558

871

271

1,700
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V. Results
Following the format used by Liu and Mantecon (2016), I will begin by first discussing
general takeaways from the stock returns of all 170 companies with respect to moat status, as
well as for each fiscal year and sector, before transitioning to my regression results.
Do wide moat stocks make for superior investments? Based on the annual returns from
2008 to 2017 in my dataset, the answer -- surprisingly -- is no. Table 5 presents basic summary
results for the average unadjusted and adjusted returns for all 1,700 annual observations
according to their moat rating. Stocks with no moats unexpectedly outperformed the wide moat
observations by a relatively significant margin, posting higher unadjusted and adjusted returns.
In turn, the narrow and no moat stocks also combined to outperform wide moat stocks as well.
Table 5: Unadjusted and Adjusted Returns by Moat (2008-2017)

Wide

Narrow

None

Wide

Non-Wide

Average Annual
Return
(Unadjusted)

12.97%

16.97%

19.84%

13.45%

17.65%

Average Annual
Return (Adjusted)

2.05%

6.78%

9.08%

2.05%

7.20%

Observations

558

871

271

558

1142

Similarly surprising results were also found based on the yearly and sector breakdowns.
Table 6 shows that non-wide moat stocks outperformed the wide moat stocks in seven of the ten
observation years. And whereas non-wide moat stocks underperformed the broader market on
only one occasion (2016), wide moat stocks lagged the market three times (2010, 2013, and
2016). As for how the success of wide moat firms varied by sector, these seemingly
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well-positioned companies once again failed to post higher unadjusted and adjusted annual
returns than their narrow and no moat counterparts (see Table 7).
Table 6: Adjusted Annual Returns
2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Wide

14.8%

2.3%

-8.0%

12.9%

1.4%

-6.0%

4.2%

8.2%

-10.7%

2.1%

NonWide

5.5%

31.7%

7.9%

0.3%

0.9%

6.0%

10.2%

8.9%

-3.7%

3.2%

Table 7: Returns by Sector (2008 - 2017)
Wide

Narrow

None

Technology
(Unadjusted)

16.71%

18.58%

23.26%

Technology
(Adjusted)

5.80%

8.14%

13.07%

Observations

167

360

143

Consumer Defensive
(Unadjusted)

11.38%

14.79%

14.59%

Consumer Defensive
(Adjusted)

-0.26%

5.43%

3.38%

Observations

163

169

68

Healthcare
(Unadjusted)

11.37%

16.35%

17.63%

Healthecare
(Adjusted)

0.72%

6.01%

6.05%

Observations

228

342

60
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What stands out the most about these results, however, is how similarly they relate to the
results found by Liu and Mantecon (2016). Table 8 indicates this resemblance, as wide moat
stocks were also found to be the worst-performing moat category in their eight-year sample
period from 2003 to 2011. This was true on both an adjusted and unadjusted basis.47 In addition,
the no moat portfolio also posted the highest average annual returns with unadjusted and adjusted
percentage totals north of 20% and 10% respectively. The no moat grouping was also followed
by the narrow moat stocks, whose returns were relatively lower compared to my sample, but
similarly outperformed wide moat stocks relatively comfortably.
Table 8: Return Comparison
Manditch (2018)

Liu and Mantecon (2016)

Wide

Narrow

None

Wide

Narrow

None

Average
Annual Return
(Unadjusted)

12.97%

16.97%

19.84%

11.2%

14.4%

21.3%

Average
Annual Return
(Unadjusted)

2.05%

6.78%

9.08%

1.6%

4.8%

11.6%

With these initial results in mind, I will turn now to my regression models.48 Using robust
standard errors to account for heteroskedasticity, W ideit was found to be negatively related to
both Returnit and AdjustedReturnit relative to the model’s narrow moat benchmark variable,

For the record, Liu and Mantecon (2016) used slightly different terminology for these terms, as they referred to
unadjusted annual returns as “raw return” and adjusted returns as “market-adjusted returns.” However, both sets of
terms are interchangeable, as they simply subtracted the benchmark return for the market in a given year by the
company-specific return, like I also did.
48
The results can be found in Table 9.
47
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while N oit was found to be positively related to each return variable.49 The results for the wide
moat variable were undoubtedly more noteworthy, though, because each coefficient was
statistically significant at the 5% level. In other words, it can be stated with confidence that if a
company in my selected sample received an upgrade to wide moat status, its annual return would
be expected to decrease by an average of 5.15%. The coefficients for N oit , meanwhile, were not
statistically significant. Furthermore, all three control variables yielded positive coefficients,
with P E it and P B it reporting results that were statistically significant. These results were in
accord with my expectations for these signs.
Table 9: Return and Adjusted Return Results

Reminder: the model’s benchmark variable is the narrow moat dummy since it was naturally omitted from the
regression results due to collinearity.
49
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However, the sign of the reported coefficients for W ideit and N oit contrasted with both
of my hypotheses. But since I previously acknowledged the possibility for unexpected signs
based on the empirical findings presented by Liu and Mantecon (2016), it appears my findings
simply add more credibility to the aforementioned paper that did not find support for wide moat
observations after including companies classified under each of the three moat categories.50 And
whereas Liu and Mantecon did not report a statistically significant coefficient for their wide moat
dummy variable, my study found a significant negative relationship at the 5% level. Taken
together with the unadjusted and adjusted return results discussed at the beginning of this
section, I have once again found little support in favor of wide moat stocks.
Table 10 shows the results for my sector-level regressions. The healthcare moat status
variable yielded the most noteworthy result, as W ideit was found to have a relatively large
negative relationship with Returnit that was statistically significant (p-value = 0.054) relative to
the narrow moat benchmark. Combined with how the coefficient for N oit was also higher than
the result for W ideit , these results suggest that wide moat healthcare stocks clearly would not be
expected to post higher returns than their non-wide moat counterparts, which is the exact
opposite of what I hypothesized. Future research should undoubtedly explore whether there is a
particular trend in the healthcare sector that may have driven these results. But based on
anecdotal evidence from companies in my dataset, it appears that patents seem to be a key
influence. For example, Allergan, a drug manufacturer, experienced 60.20% adjusted growth in
2013 as a non-wide moat firm after acquiring a number of small pharmaceutical companies that
each had extended patent licenses on their niche products (Waterhouse, 2013).

Recall that economic moat studies such as Kanuri and McLeod (2016), in contrast, only analyzed the performance
of wide moat stocks.
50
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As for the technology and consumer defensive sector regressions, the former did not yield
a noteworthy coefficient nor a statistically significant p-value for W ideit . This result was not
completely unexpected, however, as I theorized that since wide moat status may be more
difficult to maintain in a sector where companies must continuously produce innovate products
that -- even if successful -- may lose relevance relatively quickly, annual returns with respect to
moat status would be the lowest among the three sectors. Though this did not turn out to be true,
the coefficient still indicates that possessing a wide moat does not necessarily lead to strong
stock performance in the technology sector. Additionally, this argument is supported by the
coefficient for N oit which -- although not statistically significant -- yielded a high magnitude of
0.088 suggesting that the selected no moat companies in my sample were particularly profitable
relative to the narrow moat benchmark. The consumer defensive regression results, meanwhile,
were unremarkable: in short, neither the magnitude of the coefficients for W ideit and N oit nor
the respective p-values were noteworthy with respect to moat status.51

It is worth mentioning that the results for the three control variables were similar to the results for these variables
in the primary hypotheses. The only exception, however, was that the price/book variable was found to have a small
negative relationship with average annual returns in the consumer defensive sector.
51
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Table 10: Sector Regression Results

Results for the industry regressions can be found in Tables 14, 15, & 16 in the Appendix.
Results for three of the nine industries -- biotechnology, household & personal products, and
information technology -- yielded W ideit coefficients that positively related to Returnit . In fact,
the magnitudes for each of the coefficients were noteworthy: the biotechnology regression, for
instance, resulted in a coefficient of 0.226, suggesting that an upgrade from non-wide to wide
moat status led to a 22.6% increase in returns. The moat status variable for the information
technology regression had a similar coefficient (0.212). For household & personal products,
meanwhile, while the coefficient was relatively smaller (0.109), the p-value was the closest to
being statistically significant (p-value = 0.119), indicating that there is empirical evidence to
48

nearly say with confidence that wide moat status mattered in this industry over the ten-year
sample period.
Six of the other nine industries, in contrast, yielded negative coefficients with respect to
W ideit . Although none of these results were statistically significant, the magnitudes of a few of
these relationships were noteworthy. For instance, two industries within the healthcare sector -healthcare plans and medical instruments -- reported negative coefficients of -0.119 and -0.140
respectively.
Many other industries delivered noteworthy results for their respective no moat dummy
variable as well. While the biotechnology industry reported a coefficient of 0.226 for W ideit ,
this industry’s coefficient for N oit yielded an even greater positive relationship (0.530) that was
statistically significant at the 5% level, suggesting that wide moat biotechnology companies did
not necessarily make for a superior investment. A few other industries also reported positive
relationships between N oit and Returnit relative to the narrow moat benchmark: healthcare
plans, for instance, yielded a coefficient of 0.166, while semiconductors reported a coefficient of
0.260, each of which were greater than the results for their respective industry’s wide moat
variable. Furthermore, a few other industries also reported statistically significant results, such as
drug manufacturing, alcoholic beverages, and information technology. Given that each of these
three N oit coefficients were smaller than each industry’s respective W ideit result, however, it is
reasonable to say that wide moat firms in these industries made for better investments during my
selected time-frame.
Lastly, I will briefly discuss the results for my lag and interaction variables, both of
which can be found in Tables 17 & 18 in the Appendix. Introducing lag variables in order to
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account for autocorrelation, particularly among my model’s moat status classifications, did not
influence the results. In fact, lagW ideit and lagN oit essentially yielded the same coefficients
and p-values as my primary regression results in Table 9. The interaction regressions, which
attempted to gauge whether moat status had an additional impact on my three control variables,
yielded only one statistically significant result, as N oP B it was found to be positively related to
Returnit at the 1% level, suggesting that a marginal increase in average annual return led to a
6.1% increase in the interaction between no moat stocks and their respective price/book ratios. In
addition to not reporting any other significant results for the interaction variables, though, it is
worth mentioning that the magnitudes of each of these variables were miniscule, as coefficients
for variables such as W ideP B it and W ideP E it were roughly zero. Furthermore, the coefficients
for the two moat status variables were different than the moat dummy coefficients in the my two
primary regression models. While a negative coefficient was once again reported for W ideit , this
value was now statistically significant at the 1% level. N oit , meanwhile, yielded a dramatically
different result, as the coefficient was found to be negative and statistically significant at the 5%
level. Research dedicated to specifically analyzing interactions between moat status and various
control variables in more detail would likely add further insight to these relationships and
possibly explain why different values were reported for my two moat status dummy variables.

50

VI. Discussion
Nonetheless, nearly all results discussed in the previous section lead to this conclusion:
stocks deemed to have wide economic moats do not necessarily make for superior investments. I
rejected my hypothesis that wide moat stocks would outperform non-wide moat stocks based on
a variety of information, such as the differences in adjusted and unadjusted annual returns among
each moat classification and, most notably, the regression results that did not provide empirical
support for my hypothesis. Thus, my findings dispute the conclusions reached by authors such as
Kanuri and McLeod (2016) and Boyd (2005), each of whom advocated strongly in favor of wide
moat stocks. However, since their studies only looked specifically at whether wide moat firms
outperformed the market over their given sample periods, their results are not as convincing as
those provided by Liu and Mantecon (2016) due to their exclusion of narrow and no moat stocks
from their analysis.
My results, therefore, relate most strongly to the aforementioned paper that also found
insubstantial support for wide moat stocks. I will now explain why this was the case. For starters,
it is worth mentioning the limitations of my study in terms of how it may have influenced these
particular results. As mentioned briefly in Section IV, I was forced to make numerous
qualifications with respect to my data. The only way I could collect data on Morningstar’s
economic moat ratings was to first segment companies through the firm’s premium stock
screener. While Morningstar currently assigns moat ratings for roughly 17,000 publicly-traded
companies, it is impossible to access a company’s moat rating history unless Morningstar
provides an official analyst report for said company. Due to practical constraints, Morningstar’s

51

analysts only currently cover 1,002 specific companies based largely on investor demand.52 And
since I only observed companies that had been public since 2008 in order to assess the
performance of selected companies over as long of a time-frame as possible, while also focusing
on companies in three particular industries that fit this criteria, my dataset features both a
relatively small sample size as well as a selection bias.
Another limitation is that my study does not account for the possibility of
reverse-causality, or endogeneity. This limitation will be discussed further in the following
section, but my study could have accounted for this potential issue by conducting an event study
that compared differences in actual and predicted returns following a moat status change. Ideally,
I would also want annual observations over an even longer time period so as to assess whether
the importance of economic moat status has varied across time. But since most of Morningstar’s
financial data dates back only ten years, this also was not feasible for my study.
As for why I came to my particular conclusions, I will first refer back to the
efficient-market hypothesis. Though Fama’s theory regarding how it is impossible to consistently
generate superior returns relative to the market is debatable, the notion that all relevant and
available information is already priced into the market, which therefore decreases the probability
of consistently finding profitable investing opportunities, is likely a factor in explaining why
moat status was not positively correlated with annual returns. For instance, it is hardly a secret
that a wide moat company such as Coca-Cola possesses premier brand and scale advantages. It is
also reasonable to infer that wide moat companies are more popular among both institutional and
casual investors. Significant awareness of a company like Coca-Cola’s advantages, therefore,
More specifically, Morningstar applies a formal research coverage selection method that involves factoring in a
company’s relevance to client’s interests and permanence (i.e. the likelihood a covered company remains relevant
for five or more years).
52
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may raise expectations for the stock and, in turn, lower its potential to achieve extraordinary
stock growth. This dynamic has even been explored in the literature by the likes of Richardson et
al. (2012). The authors found that while investor recognition related positively to stock
performance over longer time horizons, stocks in the authors’ high-investor-recognition portfolio
had lower average annual returns (6.27%) than low-investor-recognition stocks (9.20%) over
their selected three-year sample periods.
Another driver of these results is the volatility differences between wide and non-wide
moat stocks. Table 11 shows a chart of both the 10 highest and 10 lowest adjusted annual returns
among the 1,700 observations. One notable takeaway stands out: there are no wide moat
companies listed in either table. In fact, if we were to expand this table to include the top 50
highest adjusted annual return observations, wide moat stocks would comprise only 3 of the 50
data points. No moat stocks, on the other hand, accounted for 6 of the top 7 highest adjusted
returns, with companies such as Seagate Technology posting adjusted annual returns over 250%!
In short, wide moat stocks are clearly more stable than non-wide moat stocks, while the
latter are more volatile and therefore more likely to earn extremely high returns.53 Interestingly
enough, many of the noteworthy non-wide observations also tended to be rather small. Despite
nearly 66% of the dataset featuring large-cap stocks, for example, 12 of the 20 non-wide
observations referenced in Table 11 were either mid or small-cap stocks. This observation relates
to a discussion topic in Liu and Mantecon (2016) concerning evidence that wide moat firms tend
to be large growth stocks, while non-wide moat stocks tend to be small value stocks. Referring
back to Lakonishok et al. (1994) and Fama and French (1995), large growth stocks have been

The variance for the adjusted returns of wide moat stocks in my dataset, for the record, was 4.28%. The variance
for non-wide moat stocks, in contrast, was 13.18%.
53
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found to post lower returns than small value stocks. It appears that a similar trend could be at
play with my results, as a popularity bias could exist that hinders the returns of wide moat firms,
while less popular companies deemed by a firm like Morningstar to be a risky investment may be
overlooked. Investors, in turn, may miss opportunities to gain stellar returns.

54

Table 11: Volatility of Adjusted Annual Returns
Highest Observations

Lowest Observations

Company (Year)

Adjusted
Moat Status
Annual
Return (%)

Company
(Year)

Adjusted
Annual
Return (%)

Moat Status

1. Seagate
Technology
(2009)

282.24%

None

1. Valeant
Pharmaceuticals
(2016)

-98.94%

Narrow

2. Micron
Technology
(2009)

264.13%

None

2. Endo
International
(2016)

-86.32%

None

3. Infineon
(2009)

263.81%

None

3. Blackberry
(2011)

-76.03%

None

4. Western
Digital Corp
(2009)

256.54%

None

4. Myriad
Genetics (2016)

-74.60%

Narrow

5. Nvidia (2016)

212.10%

Narrow

5. Endo
International
(2017)

-74.15%

None

6. Micron
Technology
(2013)

207.91%

None

6. Blackberry
(2013)

-72.47%

None

7. Regeneron
Pharmaceuticals
(2012)

192.61%

None

7. SINA Corp
(2014)

-66.95%

Narrow

8. Baidu (2009)

185.90%

Narrow

8. Teva
Pharmaceutical
(2017)

-66.59%

None

9. Marvell
Technology
(2009)

182.04%

Narrow

9. Marvell
Technology
(2012)

-62.29%

Narrow

10. Skyworks
Solutions (2015)

156.01%

None

10. Edward
Lifesciences
(2013)

-62.22%

Narrow
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VII. Conclusion
Further research opportunities abound within the economic moat literature. First, future
studies should analyze larger datasets. Not only was my study limited with respect to my total
number of observations, but even studies such as Kanuri and McLeod (2016) and Boyd (2005)
contained fewer than 150 companies in their annual portfolios. Additionally, a continued
emphasis on whether moats are more impactful in certain sectors rather than others would be
beneficial. This study examined the relationship between competitive advantage and stock
performance while specifically looking at companies within three particular sectors. But a future
study should include companies from a variety of other sectors, such as financial services and
energy. Further interest in industry-specific relationships between moat status and stock returns
would complement these sector-related studies as well.
Moreover, future economic moat research should attempt to conduct event-related
studies, such as the paper published by Kruger (2015), in order to account for possible
endogeneity. Though a method to determine what exactly constitutes as a moat-related event has
yet to be accepted in the literature, a news-based study examining how competitive advantage
effects short-term stock performance would successfully account for this shortcoming.
Additionally, authors have yet to explore how drivers of moat status effect stock performance. In
other words, is it more beneficial to possess, say, a superior brand identity or, rather, an
unmatched cost advantage? Also, might companies with multiple advantages post even greater
stock returns than companies with simply one competitive edge? This type of study could also
examine whether specific drivers of sustainable competitive advantage are more desirable in
certain industries rather than others.
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Nonetheless, my thesis provides an initial assessment of how the performance of stocks
based on moat status varies across three sectors and nine industries. And as to the answer of my
study’s research question, the prevalence of negative and statistically significant coefficients for
my wide moat dummy variable, as well as the surprising disparities between the average returns
of wide and non-wide moat portfolios over the ten-year sample period, certainly does not provide
resounding support for wide moat stocks being vastly superior to other investments. These
results even infer that it may be smarter to turn investing attention away from companies deemed
to have sustainable competitive advantages.
Does this mean that investors such as Buffett are wrong as to the importance of economic
moats? No, not exactly. After all, the selected wide moat stocks in my study still narrowly
outperformed the market, as seen in Table 5. Wide moat stocks also appear to be far more stable,
and thus potentially make for a more desired investment during harsher economic conditions
based on how the selected companies in my sample outperformed the market during the three
years (2008, 2011, and 2015) in which overall market returns were negative (see Table 6).
It seems, however, that economic moats are more important from a financial perspective
(i.e. in terms of whether a company can consistently earn profits) rather than an investment
perspective. Aforementioned studies by Porter (1980, 1985), Barney (1991), and Newbert (2008)
support this argument. Morningstar, however, seems to lend the impression that all wide moat
stocks will make for worthwhile investments. This is not necessarily incorrect, as evidenced by
the performance of wide moat companies included in my dataset such as Intuit. The software
application firm known for producing software such as TurboTax maintained a wide moat rating
throughout all ten years of my study and achieved strong, consistent growth: the company’s
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share price increased by an average of 11.21% per year. Yet while some other selected wide
moat companies performed similarly to Intuit, there were wide moat examples such as
AstraZeneca, a drug manufacturer, which also maintained its wide moat status throughout all ten
years but only experienced mediocre annual returns relative to the market (5.71% annual
growth). Even a famous wide moat company like Coca-Cola performed modestly during this
time-frame, growing far below the overall pace of the market at an annual rate of 4.31%.
Thus, investors can come away with plenty of applicable information based on the results
of this study. Companies with sustainable competitive advantages surprisingly may not make for
a superior stock investment. But by understanding the historical performance of companies based
on economic moat status across various sectors and industries, the path toward finding assets that
yield extraordinarily high returns will become clearer.
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VIII. Appendix
Table 12: Morningstar Moat Rating Process
Source: Morningstar Indexes Yearbook

Table 13: Industries Included in Industry-Specific Regression Models
Consumer Defensive

Healthcare

Technology

Alcoholic Beverages

Biotechnology

Information Technology

Household & Personal Products

Drug Manufacturers

Semiconductors

Health Care Plans

Software

Medical Instruments
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Table 14: Industry Results -- Healthcare Sector
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Table 15: Industry Results -- Consumer Defensive
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Table 16: Industry Results -- Technology
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Table 17: Lag Regression Results
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Table 18: Interaction Results
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